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INTRODUCTION 
Vestin Mortgage, Inc. ("Vestin") hereby submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of 
Appellee ("Opposition Brief5) of First American Title Insurance Company ("First 
American"). 
A significant portion of the Opposition Brief argues that the assessment levied by 
Eagle Mountain City ("Assessment") did not constitute a lien on the property subject to 
Vestin's trust deeds ("Property") at the time the title insurance policies ("Policies") were 
issued by First American. Vestin does not dispute that no assessment lien existed on the 
Property at the time the Policies were issued. Indeed, as made abundantly clear, Vestin 
specifically has stated it is not making such an argument. (Appellant's Brief 22 n.7, 
stating that "Vestin does not claim coverage under either the 'lien' or 'encumbrance' 
provisions of the Policies.") 
The existence of a lien, contrary to First American's argument, is not relevant to 
the issues raised by Vestin in this appeal, i.e., whether various insuring clauses contained 
in the Policies, when read in conjunction with the "governmental police power" 
provisions, afford coverage to Vestin for "defects," "incorrectness" and "other matters." 
First American ignores basic tenets of contract interpretation and fails to address 
coverage of Vestin's claims under the various insuring clauses of the Policies. First 
American similarly ignores the "police power" provision in the Policies and, based on the 
incorrect premise that the Eagle Mountain Special Improvement District ("Eagle 
Mountain SID") and Notice of Intention do not constitute the exercise of police power for 
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purposes of coverage under the Policies, summarily dismisses as inapplicable the 
exception to the police power exclusion. 
Vestin's interpretation of the Policies, consistent with rules of contract 
interpretation, affords meaning to each insuring provision in the Policies, as well as 
harmonizes these provisions with the exception to the exclusion for the exercise of 
governmental police power. The trial court's ruling incorrectly dismissed Vestin's claims 
and should accordingly be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT1 
I. FIRST AMERICAN FAILS TO ADDRESS COVERAGE OF VESTIN'S 
CLAIMS UNDER THE PERTINENT INSURING PROVISIONS OF THE 
POLICIES 
A. The Issue of Whether a Lien Existed on the Property at the Time of 
Issuance of the Policies is Irrelevant to Coverage of Vestin's Claims 
Section I of First American's argument (Opposition Brief 14-20) contains a 
lengthy argument that a lien did not exist at the time the Policies were issued. This 
argument, while correct, has no bearing on whether Vestin's claims are covered because 
the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention, regardless of their status as a "lien," 
constitute a "defect," "incorrectness" or "other matter" under the insuring clauses of the 
Policies. Because Vestin does not dispute that the Assessment was not levied and did not 
constitute a lien on the Property until after the date of issuance of the Policies, Section I 
First American claims that on appeal Vestin has pursued a new avenue to create a pre-policy 
argument for coverage. (Opposition Brief 12). In fact, Vestin has not modified its argument in 
any fashion on appeal. (Opposition Brief 29). Vestin continues to argue, as it did in the district 
court, that the creation of the Eagle Mountain SID is a title "defect," "incorrectness" and "other 
matter" affecting title and is covered by the Policies. (R. 235-238). 
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of the Opposition Brief is not mostly irrelevant to whether the Policies afford coverage to 
Vestin under the various insuring clauses of the Policies. 
Section II of First American's argument purports to address whether the Eagle 
Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention constitute a "defect" under the Policies. 
(Opposition Brief 20-21). This section, however, is merely a reiteration of First 
American's argument regarding whether a lien existed on the Property. The authority 
cited by Vestin to support its argument that no "defect" existed primarily relate to 
whether a "lien" existed for purposes of coverage under the Policies. For example, First 
American cites to I Joyce D. Palomar, Title Insurance Law § 5.5: at 5-21 (2003) 
("Palomar"), in support of its argument that no defect existed. (Opposition Brief 22). 
Palomar, however, merely states that a prospective assessment does not constitute a "lien 
or encumbrance" under a title insurance policy—a fact that Vestin does not dispute. The 
citation from Palomar relied upon by First American does not state, nor does it address, 
whether the recorded notice of the exercise of a police power constitutes a "defect" for 
purposes of title insurance coverage. Here, as throughout the Opposition Brief, First 
American glosses over the fact that a "lien" is something different than a "defect," 
"incorrectness," or "other matter" under the Policies. Because the meaning of the terms 
in the insuring provisions of the Policies are separate and distinct from the terms "lien" 
and "encumbrance," First American's reliance on authority focusing only "liens" or 
AftAOQOftzKv? 1 
"encumbrances" is not pertinent to a determination of whether Vestin's claims, as 
framed, are covered under the Policies. 
B. First American Ignores Basic Rules of Contract Construction in 
Interpreting the Insuring Provisions of the Policies 
First American applies its arguments, which are relevant only to the term "lien" as 
used in the Policies, equally to the term "defect" by lumping the words "lien," 
"encumbrance" and "defect" together as having the same meaning. First American offers 
no direct support for such a position, and merely notes that "courts use the terms defect, 
lien, and encumbrance interchangeably." (Opposition Brief 25 n.10). The 
interchangeable use of the words by some courts does not mean the words have the same 
meaning. Indeed, it is for this very reason that courts must interpret title policies 
according to their specific terms and avoid reliance on cases not addressing the 
provisions at issue. See New England Federal Credit Union v. Stewart Title Guarantee 
Co., 765 A.2d 450,453 (Vt. 2000) ("Furthermore, policies and policy language may vary. 
A closer, contextual examination of the policy is therefore necessary to resolve the issue 
before us."); Manor Real Estate v. Zamoiski Co., 246 A.2d 240, 245 (Md. App. Ct. 1968) 
(noting that courts tend to improperly equate or confuse liens with encumbrances). 
First American states that the Notice of Intention, among other things, "advised that Eagle 
Mountain City intended to create the Special Improvement District." (Opposition Brief 9). 
However, in fact, when the Notice of Intention was recorded in the public records it had attached 
to it Resolution 14-00, dated August 1, 2000, which actually created the Eagle Mountain SID. 
(R. 230, 304-306). Accordingly, the Notice of Intention gave public notice of the prior creation 
of the Eagle Mountain SID. First American also claims that Resolution 14-00 did not mention 
assessments. (Opposition Brief 9). In fact, Section 4 of the Resolution states that the properties 
will be assessed. (R. 304-305). Likewise, the Notice of Intention, which is referred to in the 
Resolution, also discloses the future assessments. (R. 304). 
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Basic rules of contract construction require that the terms in the insuring 
provisions of the Policies be given their separate, plain and ordinary meanings. See 
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Greenlands Realty, LLC, 58 F. Supp.2d 370, 382 (D.N.J. 
1999) ("Moreover, if defect was synonymous with "unmarketability," there would be no 
reason for the policy to list both terms."). Further, basic rules of contract construction 
provide that contracts must be interpreted to give effect to every word in the contract. 
See Musser v. Bank of America, 964 P.2d 51, 54 (Nev. 1998). It is impermissible for a 
court to interpret a contract so as to render any part of the contract meaningless. Id.; see 
also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 
1990) ("Each contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a 
view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.11). Finally, contracts should be 
interpreted to avoid "neutralizing or ignoring a provision or treating it as surplusage." 
Hawthorn Land Co. v. Equilon Pipeline Co., LLC, 309 F.3d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 2002). 
First American's interpretation imputing the definition of the term "lien" to other 
provisions of the Policies renders all but the term "lien" meaningless and mere surplusage 
in the Policies. 
"Lien" is defined as "a claim, encumbrance or charge on property for payment of 
some debt, obligation or duty." Blacks Law Dictionary 635 (6th ed. 1991). 
"Encumbrance" is defined as "any right to, or interest in, land which may subsist in 
another to diminution of its value, but consistent with the passing of the fee by 
conveyance." Id. at 364. The term "defect" has the much broader meaning of "the want 
or absence of some legal requisite; deficiency; imperfection; insufficiency. The absence 
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of something necessary for completeness or perfection . . . ." Id. at 289; Bel-Air Motel 
Corp. v. The Title Ins. Corp., 444 A.2d 1119, 1121-22 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981). As argued in 
Vestin's opening brief, a defect is something, however slight or trivial, that renders title 
free from doubt. See Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Greenlands Realty, LLC, 58 F. 
Supp.2d 370, 382 (D.N.J. 1999). In this case, the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of 
Intention, although not rising to the level of a "lien" on the Property, constitute a "defect" 
and therefore a deficiency in the disclosures made in the Policies falling within the terms 
of the insuring provisions of the Policies. 
In interpreting the word "defect," First American notes that it is defined as 
something that subjects property to claims of others or when property is subject to the 
claims of a third party. (Opposition Brief 21). As noted by First American, the very 
reason for the creation of a special improvement district is "for public purposes with the 
power to levy taxes for the limited purpose of the district." See Tygeson v. Magna Water 
Co., 119 Utah 274, 280, 298, 226 P.2d 127, 131, 139 (1950). The creation of the Eagle 
Mountain SID, along with the recorded Notice of Intention, subjected Vestin's Property 
to claims by a third party—the Eagle Mountain City—for improvements to be made 
within the SID. Indeed, the Eagle Mountain SID and the recording of the Notice of 
Intention would not have been undertaken but for the purpose of assessing charges to the 
property located within the boundaries of the SID. Because Vestin's property was 
subject to the claims of Eagle Mountain City pursuant to the Eagle Mountain SID, a 
covered "defect" existed at the time the Policies were issued. 
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First American argues that under the circumstances of this case, the rule of 
construction that a policy is interpreted in favor of the insured and against the insurer is 
inapplicable. (Opposition Brief 36 n.14). To support this claim, First American relies on 
Falmouth Nat'l Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 1058, 1062 (1st Cir. 1990). 
However, the Falmouth court only stated that the rationale behind interpreting an 
insurance policy against the insurer "would not seem to apply as strongly" when the 
transaction is between parties of equal sophistication and bargaining power. The case 
does not stand for the proposition that the rule of construction in favor of the insured does 
not apply in certain circumstances. Rather, the court in Falmouth recognized that the 
principle of construction still applies, but perhaps not as strongly. Furthermore, in the 
Falmouth case, as in other cases with similar holdings, the parties actually negotiated 
specific terms of the policy. Id.; see also First State Underwriters Agency of New 
England Reinsurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1311-1312 (3d Cir. 
1986) ("[T]he principle that ambiguities in policies should be strictly construed against 
the insurer does not control the situation where large corporations, advised by counsel 
and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to a negotiated policy." (Emphasis 
added)). Further, courts have distinguished the principle advanced by First American in 
cases similar to this case: 
The proffered evidence does not demonstrate that Eagle-Picher had unusual 
sophistication with respect to liability insurance, or that its small corporate 
insurance department allowed it to bargain as an equal with insurance industry 
representatives. Certainly the offer of proof does not show that Eagle-Picher "had 
so actively participated in drafting [the policies] that it should be denied the 
benefit of the usual rule" of construction in favor of the insured. 
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Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1982). 
Likewise, in this instance, First American cannot show that Vestin negotiated the Policies 
or that the usual rules of construction should otherwise not apply. 
C. The Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention Caused Injury to 
and Damage to Vestin 
In Section I.C. of its argument, First American asserts that the Eagle Mountain 
SID and the Notice of Intention are not covered under the Policies because Vestin did not 
suffer any harm until the Assessment was levied on the Property. (Opposition Brief 19-
20). First American asserts that the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention are 
inconsequential and that arguing that the Eagle Mountain SID negatively affects title is 
akin to arguing that Eagle Mountain City negatively affects title. (Opposition Brief 20). 
This argument is belied by First American's own actions in disclosing that the Property is 
located within Eagle Mountain City. In fact, First American recognizes that Eagle 
Mountain City negatively affects Vestin's lien because Eagle Mountain City is disclosed 
in the Policies in Schedule B-Part I, "Exceptions from Coverage" which states: 
This property lies within the boundaries of Eagle Mountain City and is subject to 
all charges and assessments levied hereunder. (A check was made and none were 
found.) 
(R. 107). Furthermore, First American did disclose and except from coverage in a 
preliminary title report a special improvement district, which was the wrong district. (R. 
233, 359). Significantly, First American in fact excepted from coverage the Eagle 
Mountain SID in the policy issued to Integrated Financial Services. (R. 234, 396-97). 
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First American's actions therefore contradict its argument that the Eagle Mountain SID 
does not negatively impact Vestin and does not need to be excepted from coverage. 
First American's argument that the Eagle Mountain SID and Notice of Intention 
caused no harm to Vestin ignores case law cited by Vestin confirming that the recorded 
notice of a future assessment constitutes damage under a title insurance policy. In Bel-
Air Motel Corp. v. The Title Ins. Corp., 444 A.2d 1119 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981), the court 
held that although an improvement assessment had not been levied at the time the title 
insurance policy was issued, "Bel-Air . . . bought its property subject to a liability: the 
obligation to pay the assessment when its amount was fixed, an obligation which would 
ripen into a lien when the assessment was confirmed." Id. at 1122.3 
In this case, Vestin, like the plaintiff in Bel-Air, was subject to the future 
Assessment by virtue of the creation of the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of 
Intention regarding the Assessment. The fact that the actual amount of the Assessment 
was not determined until after the date of the Policies is of no moment. The Eagle 
Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention recorded in the public records subjected 
Vestin's Property to claims by Eagle Mountain for the improvement Assessment, thereby 
The Bel-Air court further stated: 
Bel-Air's property was subject to a definite liability. It would be assessed for part of the 
cost of the local improvement. The assessment, when confirmed, would become a lien 
against the property. These circumstances prevented the title to the property from being 
"relatively free from doubt." At a minimum, it is obvious that Bel-Air would have been 
exposed to litigation concerning its title if it challenged the assessment or decided to 
press a claim against the seller for its payment. Title, therefore, was not marketable and 
[the insurer] became liable for any loss occasioned by that circumstance. 
Id. at 1123. 
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causing damages, the amount of which was determined upon the adoption of the 
Assessment Ordinance and levy of the Assessment Lien. 
Similarly, in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Fidelity Title Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 714 
(8th Cir. 2001), the court held that a notice of claim against the insured property, whether 
valid or not, caused injury because such a claim might force a person into litigation. See 
id. at 719. The prospect of future litigation, though not inevitable, was a covered 
"defect" under the policy. See id. 
As established by the case law, the fact that a "defect" causes future damage 
which may not be definite or fixed does not preclude coverage under a title insurance 
policy. Rather, a flaw in title that subjects an insured to injury at some future time is a 
covered "defect." In this case, the existence of the Eagle Mountain SID, as well as the 
Notice of Intention, subjected Vestin to claims by Eagle Mountain for improvement 
assessments. The fact that the exact amount of the assessments had not yet been 
determined does not mean that Vestin has not suffered injury and loss due to the covered 
defects.4 
First American argues that since Vestin will benefit from the improvements it will not sustain 
any damage, and, therefore, First American should not be obligated to compensate Vestin. 
Interestingly, the Policies insure against "[a]ny assessments for street improvements under 
construction or completed at Date of Policy which now have gained or hereafter may gain 
priority over the insured mortgage...." This provision specifically imposes liability on First 
American for a future assessment, even if the landowner benefits from the street improvement. 
The issue addressed by this provision is very analogous, if not the same, to the facts in this case. 
In any event, the issue of damage was not an issue raised in First American's Motion to Dismiss, 
and is therefore not before this Court. Also, the claim is not supported by any citation to fact. 
The only evidence before the Court is that Vestin has sustained a compensable loss and injury. 
(R. 232-34). If Vestin has benefited by the assessments or improvements, then, in such event, 
Vestin's damage claim will be reduced accordingly. As noted in Palomar § 5:5, 5-22, a benefit 
from a special assessment reduces the recoverable damages. This issue must be resolved by trial. 
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D. Case Law Relied Upon by Vestin Supports Coverage Under the 
Policies for "Defects" 
In Section II.B. of its Opposition Brief, First American argues that authority relied 
upon by Vestin in interpreting the term "defect" does not support Vestin's interpretation 
of the Policies. (Opposition Brief 27-28). For example, First American contends that the 
definition of "defect" in the Stewart Title case does not support Vestin's claim. In fact, 
the "defect" at issue in that case was much less significant than the Eagle Mountain SID 
and the Notice of Intention. In that case, a "scriveners" or typographical error left some 
doubt as to whether title to a certain strip of land was conveyed along with a larger 
portion of land. The Stewart Title court held that although the error was not one that 
affected marketability of title, the error, however trivial, nonetheless constituted a 
"defect" in title and was therefore covered under the title insurance policy. See Stewart 
Title, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 382. In this case, the existence of the Eagle Mountain SID and 
the Notice of Intention are much more of a "defect" than a simple typographical error not 
affecting title to property. In contrast, the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of 
Intention clearly effect title by subjecting Vestin to claims by Eagle Mountain against its 
property for improvements. 
First American further argues that interpretation of the word "defect" in United 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Fidelity Title Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2001), does not 
support coverage for Vestin's claim in this appeal. The term "defect," as defined in 
United Fire & Casualty, confirms that the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of 
Intention are covered defects under the Policies. In that case, the court held that the term 
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defect is defined as "any fault or shortcoming or failing." See id. at 719. The court 
further held that the term "defect," which was not defined in the policy, must be given its 
plain and ordinary meaning and could not be construed according to the insured's 
narrower and more technical interpretation of the word. See id. at 720. There, a claim 
against title, "regardless of validity," constituted a "defect" under the policy. Id. at 719. 
In this case, First American attempts to apply the more specific meaning of the 
word "lien" to the term "defect" under the Policies. Rules of contract construction, as 
well as case law interpreting the term "defect," prohibit such a construction. 
Coverage of Vestin's claim depends on interpretation of the term "defect," as well 
as the other insuring clauses discussed hereafter. First American, however, ignores this 
portion of the Policy that insures against "defects" and instead bases its arguments solely 
on the term "lien" under the Policies. First American's failure to differentiate between 
the definitions of different words in the Policies is fatal to its position. This Court should 
properly conclude that the creation of the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of 
Intention constituted a "defect" covered under the Policies. 
II. CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY FIRST AMERICAN DOES NOT 
SUPPORT ITS POSITION 
A. The Authority Relied Upon by First American Does Not Address 
Coverage Under the Policies in this Case 
First American argues that case law and treatise authority overwhelmingly support 
its position. (Opposition Brief 22-28). However, none of the cases relied upon by First 
American address the "police power55 clause. As discussed further below, the "police 
power'5 provision is central to the interpretation of coverage in this case. Because the 
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cases relied upon by First American do not address that issue, they are not pertinent to an 
interpretation of the policy language at issue in this case. In addition, the cases relied 
upon by First American are otherwise distinguishable from this case. For example, the 
policy at issue in Edwards v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co, 563 P.2d 979 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977), 
contained a specific exclusion for tax liens which had not been levied at the time the 
policy was issued. The policy in that case provided that "the company does not, by this 
policy, insure, including: "Taxes and assessments not yet due or payable and Special 
Assessments not yet certified to the Treasurer's office." Id. at 980 (emphasis in original). 
Such a provision is not at issue in this case. In addition, in the Edwards case, there was 
no recorded notice of the exercise of governmental police power and the concomitant 
notice of intent to levy taxes on the property. Because Edwards does not address the 
issues raised by Vestin for coverage under the Policies, the case should accordingly be 
disregarded by this Court. 
Similarly, the holding in Strass v. District-Realty Title Ins. Corp., 358 A.2d 251 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1976), was specifically limited to whether the assessment at issue in that 
case constituted "liens" on the subject property. In determining that the title insurance 
policies at issue in that case did not cover the assessments as liens, the Strass court 
recognized that the definition of liens and encumbrances are not necessarily co-extensive 
and that in some circumstances, assessments that have not become a lien on property may 
nonetheless constitute an encumbrance on property. See id. at 257 (emphasis in original). 
Thus, the Strass case is inconsistent with First American's conclusion that the terms 
"defect," "lien" and "encumbrance" are interchangeable in the context of title insurance. 
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Other cases relied upon by First American also fail to address the issue in this 
case, i.e., whether a recorded notice of the exercise of police power and a prospective 
assessment constituted a "defect" under the Policies or an event covered by the other 
insuring clauses in the Policies. See Butcher v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 216 N.W.2d 
434 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (addressing only whether assessments constituted "liens" or 
"encumbrances" under the policy); Cole v. Home Title Guaranty Co., 244 N.E.2d 470 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1968) (same); Medeiros v. Guardian Title & Guaranty Agency, Inc., 387 
N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that assessment lien constituted a "special 
assessment" under real estate purchase agreement). 
The cases relied upon by First American address a common scenario in which a 
title insurance policy, without regard to the police power provision, covers a pre-policy 
liens. Such is the not issue in this case. This case deals with a unique situation where the 
insuring clauses must be read in light of coverage provided for the recorded notice of the 
exercise of governmental police power.5 
B. First American Fails to Distinguish Case Law Relied Upon by Vestin 
First American argues that Bel-Air Motel Corp. v. The Title Ins. Corp., 444 A.2d 
1119 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981), which is relied upon by Vestin in its opening brief, supports its 
interpretation of the Policies. To the contrary, Bel-Air, unlike the cases relied upon First 
5
 In its footnote 9, First American argues that Vestin incorrectly suggests that the Edwards court 
did not address the prospective assessment as a title "defect." (Opposition Brief 24). In fact, 
however, Vestin argued that the Edwards court did not address the issue of a title defect in the 
context of the police power exception, which it clearly did not do. (Appellant's Brief 23). First 
American's contention further highlights the fact that it simply ignores the "police power" 
exception throughout its Brief, even when purporting to respond to Vestin's arguments based 
upon the police power exception. 
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American, interprets the insuring clause of the policy which is substantially similar to the 
Policies at issue in this case, in conjunction with the exclusion to the exception for the 
exercise of governmental police power. In holding that the policy provided coverage for 
an assessment which had not become a lien at the time of issuance of the policy, the court 
harmonized the policy's requirement of coverage for existing "defects" with the required 
coverage for a recorded exercise of governmental police power. See id. at 1122. 
Similarly in this case, the only interpretation of the Policies which harmonizes the 
insuring provision with the police power provision is one that affords coverage to Vestin. 
First American fails to address the holding in New England Federal Credit Union 
v. Stewart Title Guarantee Co., 765 A.2d 450 (Vt. 2000). Like Bel-Air, the New England 
court found that a recorded notice of the exercise of governmental police power was 
covered under a police power provision similar to the provision at issue in this case. New 
England is further instructive as it specifically notes that courts often inappropriately use 
the terms "defect," "lien" or "encumbrance" interchangeably, requiring a close contextual 
examination of the language of an insurance policy. See id. at 453. Further, the New 
England court stated that cases addressing policies that do not include a police power 
provision "are of limited value" because of the differences in policy language. See id. at 
454. As noted above, the cases relied upon by First American do not interpret the crucial 
language and policy provisions at issue in this case and are therefore inapposite to the 
issues before this Court. 
III. FIRST AMERICAN HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS COVERAGE OF 
VESTIN'S CLAIMS UNDER THE "POLICE POWER" PROVISION IN 
THE POLICIES 
606:292045v2 1 r 
A. First American Acknowledges that the Eagle Mountain SID and the 
Notice of Intention Constitute Exercise of the Police Power 
First American cites various portions of both the Palomar treatise and Barlow 
Burke, Law of Title Insurance (3rd ed. 2000) ("Burke"), and claims that those treatises do not 
support the position of Vestin. (Opposition Brief 22-23) First American, however, 
ignores those portions of the treatises which specifically address the police power 
provision at issue in the Policies, which recognize the general rule of liability: that the 
exercise of police power that is of public record is a covered event. According to both of 
those treatises, if the governmental action is recorded in the public records prior to the 
issuance of the policy, the insurer is liable under the policy unless the notice is excluded 
from coverage. As noted in Palomar. 
Title policies do cover insured's losses resulting from governmental police powers 
to the extent that a notice of the exercise thereof ... was recorded in the public 
records prior to the policy date. 
Palomar at 6-13. See also Burke, § 4.02[B] at 4-27 ("However, notwithstanding the 
exclusion, the insurer is liable when a notice of the exercise of police power either "has 
been recorded" (the 1990 version) or appears (the 1970 version) in the public records at 
the Date of Policy.").6 
First American states that Vestin did not specifically plead the police power provision in its 
Complaint. (Opposition Brief 29). Copies of the Policies, which include the police power 
provision, were attached and incorporated into the Complaint. Specific reference to the police 
power provision in the Complaint is not required under Utah's notice pleading requirements. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a); Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass'n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 674 
(Alaska, 2002) ("[A] complaint gives the defendant sufficient notice if it generally alleges that a 
contract existed and was breached in a way that damaged the plaintiff."); Zattiero v. Homedale 
Sch Dist. No. 370, 51 P.3d 382, 386 (Idaho 2002). 
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First American contends that the levy of the Assessment was a "separate and 
distinct" exercise of governmental police power—suggesting that it agrees that the 
creation of the Eagle Mountain SID and the recorded Notice of Intention also constitute 
the exercise of governmental police power. (Opposition Brief 30). First American fails 
to explain, however, why the adoption of the Ordinance creating the Eagle Mountain SID 
and the Notice of Intention, as opposed to the Assessment Ordinance and levy of the 
Assessments, would not fall within the language of the police power provision of the 
Policies. The Policies provide coverage for the exercise of "[a]ny governmental police 
power . . ." that is recorded in the public records. There is no qualifying language that 
suggests that notice of "preliminary action" is not a covered event. First American's 
acknowledgment that the creation of the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention 
constitute the exercise of police power confirms that Vestin's claim is covered under the 
police power provision of the Policies. 
B. First American Improperly Concludes that Only the Assessment Lien 
Constitutes the Exercise of Police Power 
First American also argues that the creation of the Eagle Mountain SID and the 
Notice of Intention do not constitute the exercise of the governmental police power. 
(Opposition Brief 31). First American ignores the plethora of authority cited by Vestin in 
First American argues that Vestin incorrectly states that the trial court concluded that the 
creation of the Eagle Mountain SID was not an exercise of police power, and that Paragraph 4 of 
the Order only recites that the Notice of Intention "was not a notice of the exercise of a 
governmental police power." (Opposition Brief 30). The distinction that First American 
attempts to make is without difference. Clearly, the Notice was a notice of the creation of the 
Eagle Mountain SID. The ordinance creating the SID is part of the Notice of Intention. If the 
Notice of Intent is not a notice of the exercise of police power, as First American contends, than 
the only reasonable conclusion is that the Court found that creation of the Eagle Mountain SID 
was not an exercise of police power. 
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its opening brief and instead concludes that "there is no exercise of the police power until 
a municipality passes an ordinance and thereby 'actually levies the assessment.5" 
(Opposition Brief 31-32). First American has cited no authority, and indeed there is 
none, which supports the proposition that only an actual assessment, as opposed to an 
ordinance creating an improvement district, constitutes the exercise of governmental 
police power. It is axiomatic that the undertaking of actions by a municipality pursuant 
to statutory authority constitutes the exercise of governmental police power. Rupp v. 
Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 340 (Utah 1980) (the actions of a municipality undertaken 
pursuant to express statutory authority, such as the creation of a municipal sewer system, 
constitute the valid exercise of the governmental police power); Maple Leaf Investors, 
Inc. v. The Dept. of Ecology, 565 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Wash. 1977) (same); Winters v. 
Sawyer, 463 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tenn. 1971) (same); West Frankfort v. Fullop, 129 N.E.2d 
682, 685 (111. 1955); State v. Joseph, 133 A. 352 (Vt. 1926) (same). 
As First American correctly notes, the Utah Municipal Improvement District Act 
("Act") specifically provides for creation of special improvement districts within the state 
of Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-301 through § 17A-3-345. The Act further 
provides, and indeed mandates, recordation of the creation of a special improvement 
district in the public records. See Utah Code Ann.§ 17A-3-307(6)(a)(i). Thus, the creation 
of the Eagle Mountain SID, as well as the Notice of Intention recorded incident to the 
Eagle Mountain SID, were undertaken by Eagle Mountain City pursuant to statutory 
authority and therefore constitute the exercise of governmental police power. 
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Because First American incorrectly concludes that only the levy of an actual 
assessment can constitute the exercise of police power, it fails to address the exception to 
the exclusion which provides coverage for the recorded notice of such exercise. 
IV. THE EAGLE MOUNTAIN SID AND THE NOTICE OF INTENTION 
CONSTITUTE AN "INCORRECTNESS" IN THE POLICIES 
First American argues that Vestin's claim does not fall under the portion of the 
Policies that insures against an "incorrectness" in the representations contained in the 
Policies on the basis that there are no restrictions which cut off, subordinate or otherwise 
impair Vestin's lien on the Property. (Opposition Brief 33). First American again 
ignores the plain meaning of the word "restriction" and summarily states that none exists. 
However, the existence of the Eagle Mountain SID and the recorded Notice of Intention 
subjected the Property to claims by a third party. Regardless of whether the actual 
amount of the claims against the Property by Eagle Mountain for the assessment had been 
determined, the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention nonetheless harmed 
Vestin in restricting Vestin's ability to use the property, e.g., sell the property without the 
adverse effect of the acceleration of the Assessment. 
First American then reiterates its argument that because Vestin suffered no harm 
as a result of the Eagle Mountain SID or Notice of Intention, they could not have 
"impaired" Vestin's mortgage on the Property. Rather than reading each word of the 
Policies in context and construing the plain meaning of the terms as required by the rules 
of contract construction, First American simply concludes that because no lien with 
priority over Vestin's Trust Deeds existed, no restriction existed and Vestin's mortgages 
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were not impaired. Rather than reading the word "impair" with its plain meaning, First 
American interprets it to mean being subordinated by another lien. The plain meaning of 
the terms in the provision does not support such a narrow reading. 
The Policies provide coverage for any "[i]ncorrectness in the assurances which the 
Company hereby gives . . . [t]hat there are no covenants, conditions, or restrictions under 
which the lien of the mortgage can be cut off, subordinated, or otherwise impaired." (R. 
371). Therefore, a lien such as the Assessment Lien which existed on the property and 
which has priority over Vestin's Trust Deeds would be covered. However, coverage is 
not limited only to the existence of perfected liens but is extended to anything which 
"impairs" Vestin's liens. Id. The term "impair" is defined as "[t]o weaken, to make 
worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner." 
Blacks Law Dictionary 516 (6in ed. 1991); see also Bel-Air Motel Corp. v. The Title Ins. 
Corp. ofPenn., 444 A.2d 1119, 1123 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981), discussed supra, at 9-10. 
The Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention, although they did not create 
a lien superior to or which subordinated Vestin's mortgages, did "impair" Vestin's title in 
that they affected Vestin's title in a negative manner. As explained above, the Eagle 
Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention subjected Vestin's Property to eventual 
assessments in excess of $2 million. The fact that the exact amount of the assessments 
had not been determined does not change the fact that the failure to disclose the Eagle 
Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention constituted an "impairment" subjecting 
Vestin's Property to the claims of Eagle Mountain for improvements. (R. 371). Because 
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First American's narrow reading of this provision is incorrect, this Court should reverse 
the decision of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings. 
V. THE EAGLE MOUNTAIN SID AND THE NOTICE OF INTENTION ARE 
"OTHER MATTERS" AFFECTING THE PRIORITY OF VESTIN'S 
TRUST DEEDS 
In arguing that the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention do not 
constitute an "other matter" under the CLTA Form 104 Endorsements to Policies, First 
American again falls back on the erroneous position the term "lien" has the same 
definition as the term "other matter." Such an interpretation, however, ignores the plain 
meaning of the word "matter" and would render it meaningless and superfluous. 
"Matter" includes "facts material to [an] issue . . . event [or] occurrence." Blacks p. 675-
76. In this case, the existence of the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention, 
without question, constitute facts material to the Property. If Vestin had known about the 
Eagle Mountain SID, the impending assessment, and the acceleration of the assessment 
upon voluntary transfer, it could have restructured the sale of the Property, or chosen not 
to purchase the Property at all. Because the Notice of Intention would have had such a 
drastic effect on Vestin's actions, it was clearly a "matter" relevant to the Property 
subject to the Trust Deeds insured by the Policies. 
First American makes the argument that Vestin has no claim under on Policy No. 2701 on the 
grounds that it was issued before the Notice of Intention was filed. (Opposition Brief 8, 16 n.4, 
18). However, as discussed in Appellant's Brief, the CLTA Form 104 Endorsements, which 
insure against "other matters" affecting title, are effective as of the date of issuance of the 
Endorsement. In this case, the Endorsements were issued after the date of the Policies and also 
after the Notice of Intention was filed. (Appellant's Brief 6-7). In this regard, in Burke § 3.03 at 
3-51, it is stated: 
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VI. FIRST AMERICAN'S INTERPRETATION DOES NOT RENDER THE 
POLICIES UNAMBIGUOUS 
First American argues that the Policies are not ambiguous and that its 
interpretation of the Policies harmonizes the insuring clauses and the police power 
provision. (Opposition Brief, p. 35-38). First American contends that the "commonly 
accepted meanings" of the insuring provisions, as well as the police power provision, 
provide no coverage to Vestin. Id. The first flaw in this argument is that First American 
does not construe the terms in the Policies according to their "commonly accepted 
meanings," as required by the basic rule of construction. Rather, as noted, First 
American has ignored the plain meaning of the insuring provisions in the Policies and has 
simply applied the meaning of the term to "lien" to the terms "defect," "restriction," 
"impair" and "other matter." In addition, First American's construction of the police 
power provision is based on the faulty premise that only the Assessment itself, not the 
creation of the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention, constitutes the exercise 
of police power under the Policies. As with all the other provisions relied upon by 
Vestin, First American ignores the plain meaning of the police power provision and 
summarily concludes that it applies only to the actual Assessment Lien. Even accepting 
First American's interpretation of the insuring clauses, the Policies would be rendered 
ambiguous because of the coverage afforded to Vestin under the police power provision. 
When, however, the insurer expressly consents to a general endorsement of a policy, the 
date of the endorsement controls the liability of the insurer. Defects in title falling within 
the scope of the endorsement and arising between the original date of the policy and the 
date of the endorsement are covered by the policy thereafter. The insurer has the duty to 
search the title for defects discoverable in the land records filed between those dates 
before issuing the endorsement. 
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First American argues that Vestin has impermissibly submitted the affidavits of 
Daniel Stubbs and Thomas Lea. This argument ignores Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b) which specifically allows for the submission of matters outside the pleadings and 
conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. (Appellant Brief 
14 n.3) In addition, Utah courts have specifically held that any relevant evidence may be 
considered in determining whether a contract is ambiguous and to determine the parties' 
intent. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). The 
affidavit of Daniel Stubbs establishes the harm suffered by Vestin as result of First 
American's failure to disclose the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention, i.e., 
Vestin was prevented from restructuring the purchase of the property, or deciding not to 
purchase at all, to avoid the acceleration of the Assessment. It is inconsistent for First 
American to argue that Vestin has failed to show that at it suffered any harm, and then 
argue that Vestin is not permitted to introduce evidence of that very harm. Finally, both 
the Lea and Stubbs affidavits show that it is both industry practice, and the practice of 
First American itself, to disclose in a title insurance policy if the insured property is 
located within a special improvement district. See Somerset Saving Bank v. Chicago 
Title, Ins. Co., 649 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Mass. 1995) ("pertinent customs and usage are, 
by implication, incorporated into a policy and are admissible to aid in policy 
interpretation.").9 Both the Stubbs and Lea Affidavits were properly submitted by Vestin 
9
 First American argues in its footnote 15 that the affidavits submitted by Vestin "contain 
irrelevant and self-serving statements and legal conclusions," and makes the general objection 
that the affidavits lack proper foundation and reliability. In fact, the affidavits are relevant 
because they contain information that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
606:292045v2 O ^ 
in opposing First American's motion to dismiss and, at the very least, raise ambiguities 
and issues of fact precluding summary disposition of this action.1 
CONCLUSION 
Each portion of First American's argument is premised on the same incorrect 
assumption, i.e., that only recorded liens are covered under the Policies. Accepting First 
American's construction of the Policies would require this Court to ignore critical terms 
and provisions contained in the Policies. First American's interpretation would, in 
essence, be equivalent to stating that the terms "encumbrance," "defect," "restriction," 
"incorrectness," "impair, " "other matter," and the insuring and police power provisions 
have one and only one meaning: a recorded lien. Such an interpretation, while 
convenient for First American, directly contradicts rules of contract interpretation and 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. In this case, for example, the affidavits set forth the 
matters discussed in the foregoing text. Furthermore, the general objection made by First 
American does not preserve the objection for review. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). As to the 
claim of self-serving, affidavits are obviously submitted by a party in support of its position. As 
long as the affidavit complies with evidentiary rules, it is admissible. 
In footnote 15 of the Opposition Brief, First American argues that Vestin attempts to convert 
the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by submitting affidavits. First 
American argues that Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501 (2)(B), now Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 7, requires that an opposition to a motion for summary judgment must contain a 
verbatim restatement of the movant's facts which the party contends an issue of fact exists, and 
that Vestin failed to do so. First American concludes that therefore the request that the matter be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment be disregarded. When materials outside the pleadings 
are filed in response to a motion to dismiss, it is within the Court's discretion to consider such 
matters. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). Only if the court does not exclude the submitted materials is 
the motion treated as one for summary judgment, and then "all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Not until the Court 
considers the material does the motion convert to a motion for summary judgment. As a result, 
there was no requirement that Vestin comply with Rule 4-501 until after the Court first 
determines to consider materials outside of the pleadings and converts the motion to one for 
summary judgment. Accordingly, Vestin did not fail to comply with Rule 4-501. 
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would nullify the insuring provisions of the Policies, as well as the exception to the 
exclusion which confirms coverage in this instance. 
A simple reading of the plain and ordinary terms of the Policies demonstrates that 
the Eagle Mountain SID and the Notice of Intention, while not an existing lien, even so 
still fall within the meaning of the terms "defect," "restriction" and "other matter" in the 
Policies. Further, the only interpretation of the police power provision which comports 
with well-established case law is one that confirms that the recorded Notice of Intention 
falls within the exception to the exclusion for the exercise of police power. 
Vestin's interpretation of the Policies comports with well-established rules of 
contract interpretation and harmonizes all provisions of the Policy to provide coverage to 
Vestin. At a minimum, the police power provision, which unequivocally provides 
coverage for Vestin's claims, creates an ambiguity in the Policies. 
The district court erred in dismissing Vestin's Complaint and this case should 
accordingly be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
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